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BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements and its compatibility with the non-discrimination provisions in tax 
treaties and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 
This article illustrates the BEPS proposals to fight against hybrid mismatch arrangements. It 
concentrates on exemption / non-inclusion schemes and double deduction schemes and analyses 
whether these proposals are in line with the non-discrimination provisions contained in tax treaties 
and in the TFEU. The article comes to the conclusion that the proposals generally comply with the 
non-discrimination provisions. However, with regard to double deduction schemes the OECD 
proposes to deny a deduction in the permanent establishment state if the payments are also 
deductible in the head office state. In the author’s opinion this recommendation conflicts with the 
freedom of establishment contained in the TFEU. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its Report 
“Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements Action 2: 2014 Deliverable” on 
September 16, 2014.2 Its suggestions rely on the Report of March 5, 2012 on “Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues ““3, the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
Report” Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” of February 12, 20124 and the BEPS “Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” of July 19, 2013.5 This article illustrates some of the proposed 
hybrid mismatch rules and analyses whether these rules are in line with the requirements of tax 
treaty and EU law. The article starts with the proposals to tackle deduction and non-inclusion 
                                                          
 
 
1 Prof. Dr. Alexander Rust, LL.M. (NYU). The author is professor of international tax law at the 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Vienna. 
2 OECD Report of September 16, 2014 Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, ACTION 2: 
2014 Deliverable OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report) (Paris: 
OECD Publishing 2014).available at:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218819-en [Accessed May 26, 2015]. 
3 OECD Report of 5 March 2012, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, (Paris, 
OECD Publishing , 2012) available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf.[Accessed May 26, 2015]. 
4 OECD Report of 12 February 2012, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (Paris, OECD Publishing , 2012)  
available at:  http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2313151e.pdf?expires=1422471561&id=id&accname=ocid177428&checksum
=159224BE66F3B7D656AAD29A8A8D7AE9.[Accessed May 26, 2015]. 
5 OECD Report of 19 July 2013, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, (Paris, OECD Publishing , 2013) 
available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2313331e.pdf?expires=1422471469&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4E28
59B8AA78EE1DEBC92C76A5FA15D1.[Accessed May 26, 2015]. For EU measures to fight against hybrid 
mismatch arrangements see European Commission of 6 December 2012, Action Plan to strengthen the fight 
against tax fraud and tax evasion, COM(2012) 722 final; European Commission of 6 December 2012, 
Recommendation on aggressive tax planning, COM(2012) 8806 final; see also the changes made by the Council 
Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States.  
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schemes making use of hybrid financial instruments and then examines the suggestions made 
concerning double deduction schemes. 
2. Deduction / Non-Inclusion Schemes 
2.1. Tax Planning Opportunities 
In the second chapter of the Report, the OECD addresses tax planning arrangements where the 
taxpayer obtains a tax deduction for payments in one state without having to include the payment in 
the tax base in another state. The easiest way to set up a deduction / non-inclusion scheme is to 
establish a company in a tax haven. If this company grants a loan to a company located in a high tax 
country the interest payments are deductible in the high tax country while the payments are subject 
to no or only to a low taxation at the level of the company in the tax haven. A similar result can be 
obtained through the use of special tax regimes. Many high tax countries grant special tax privileges 
for certain types of income. For example, patent box regimes have become popular during recent 
years.6 The Netherlands, for example, tax corporate income at a rate of between 20 per cent and 25 
per cent. Income covered by the “Innovatiebox” (innovation)regime are only subject to a tax rate of 
5per cent. Royalty payments for the use of a patent reduce the tax base of the company.  
The OECD Report deals with several situations where the taxpayer uses a hybrid financial instrument 
to obtain a deduction for interest payments in one country and an exemption for dividends in 
another country because the instrument is characterized as debt in the former and as equity in the 
latter country.7 For financial instruments some countries follow a more formalistic approach while 
other countries apply a substance over form approach. Due to these different approaches it is 
possible that a hybrid financial instrument which has elements of a debt instrument and elements of 
an equity instrument will be characterised differently.  
The same benefit of deduction/non-inclusion can also be achieved through investment via a 
partnership.8 In some countries partnerships are treated as transparent entities and their profits are 
taxed at the level of the partners. In other countries partnerships are treated as non-transparent 
entities and the profit is taxed at the level of the partnership. The partners are only taxed if the 
                                                          
6 A good overview of the different patent box regimes is given by L.Evers, H.Miller, C.Spengel, “Intellectual 
Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations,” International Tax and Public Finance 
June 2015, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 502-530 , available for download at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10797-014-9328-x  [Accessed May 27, 2015]. 
7 OECD BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2, para 52; for the distinction between equity and debt see 
J.A. Duncan, “Tax treatment of hybrid financial instruments in crossborder transactions”, IFA Cahiers de droit 
fiscal international, Vol. LXXXVa (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 22 et seq. and the respective 
national reports; Schön et al, “Debt and Equity in Domestic and International Tax Law – A Comparative Policy 
Analysis” [2014] BTR 146. 
8 OECD BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2, para 72. 
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partnership’s profit is distributed to them. If persons who are resident in a country which treats 
partnerships as transparent entities set up a partnership in another country which treats 
partnerships as non-transparent entities then a qualification conflict will arise. If the partners grant a 
loan to their partnership the interest payments are deductible at the level of the partnership as the 
partnership state regards the partnership as a taxable entity in that state. For the partners the 
interest payments are, however, not taxable as the loan is ignored in the state in which the partners 
are resident as that state will regard it as a transaction between two parts of the same taxpayer. If 
the partnership does not have any additional positive income the interest expenses can be used for 
tax purposes via a group regime. A deduction / non-inclusion scheme can also be achieved if three 
countries are involved:9 Two corporations which are resident in State A treating partnerships as non-
transparent set up a partnership in State B which regards partnerships as transparent. As a next step 
the partnership grants a loan to a corporation resident in a third State C which treats partnerships as 
non-transparent entities. From the perspective of State A and State C interest is paid from a 
corporation in State C to another taxable entity located in State B. State C will grant a deduction for 
the interest payments and State C will not tax the payments as they are sheltered by the taxable 
entity in State B. From the perspective of State B, however, the partnership is not a taxable entity. As 
long as the partnership does not constitute a permanent establishment in its territory State B will not 
tax the interest payments. As a result, State C will grant a deduction while neither State B nor State A 
will tax the payments.  
2.2. Proposals to tackle tax planning arrangements based on hybrid instruments and 
hybrid entities 
The most effective way to avoid these qualification conflicts would be the harmonisation of the tax 
laws in the countries concerned. If all countries had the same rules for the distinction between equity 
and debt qualification conflicts would no longer arise. Tax planning arrangements involving hybrid 
entities could also be tackled if all countries treated partnerships either as transparent or non-
transparent entities. However, even within the EU it is not very probable that countries will be willing 
to harmonise their tax rules.10 The OECD proposes a linking rule to solve qualification conflicts. Each 
country should adapt its tax rules to the tax treatment in the other country. If one country treats a 
payment either as interest or as a dividend the other country should follow that approach. As it is 
unlikely that all countries will adopt this approach the OECD addresses both countries to make sure 
one of the two countries involved will implement the OECD recommendations.11  
                                                          
9 OECD BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2, para 80. 
10 For example, the proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base dates from 
2011 and it is unclear whether it will be enacted in the nearby future.  
11 OECD, BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2, para 60. 
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According to the OECD, it is the country in which the payment is made that should adapt its tax rules 
to the rules of the country in which the recipient of the payment is located. The OECD labels this the 
“primary response”: a country should disallow a deduction for a payment if the payment is exempt 
from tax in the country of the recipient. If, however, the country where the payment is made does 
not disallow the deduction for the payment then it is the task of the country in which the recipient is 
located to tax the payment and not to apply its exemption system. This linking rule requires an 
extensive exchange of information, as countries have to know the tax rules concerning the distinction 
between debt and equity, the deductibility of interest payments and the exemption for dividends of 
all other countries involved.  
2.2.1. Primary Response 
The “primary response” – denying the deductibility of interest payments if the payments are tax 
exempt in the recipient country – has already been implemented in Austria. In accordance with Sec. 
12(1) N°10 Austrian Corporate Income Tax Act (CITA), interest payments are not deductible at the 
level of the payer if the payments are made to a foreign corporation, the paying and the receiving 
corporation belong to the same group and the payment is not taxed at the level of the receiving 
company due to an exemption.12 In Germany, the Federal Council wanted to introduce a similar 
provision disallowing the deduction of interest payments if the country of the recipient does not 
characterise the income as interest.13  This provision, however, did not enter into force.  
Disallowing the deduction of interest payments neither violates the tax treaty non-discrimination 
provisions nor the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).  
2.2.1.1. Compatibility of the “primary response” with Article 24(4) OECD 
Model Tax Convention  
                                                          
12 See Beiser, Ausgewogene Aufteilung der Ertragsteuerbefugnis und Abzug von Schuldzinsen und 
Lizenzgebühren, SWI 2014, 261; Dziurdz/Marchgraber, Überlegungen zum konzerninternen Abzugsverbot für 
“niedrig besteuerte“ Zinsen und Lizenzgebühren, ÖStZ 2014, 378; Peyerl, Das neue Abzugsverbot für Zins- und 
Lizenzzahlungen im Konzern, ÖStZ 2014, 223; Polivanova-Rosenauer, AbgÄG 2014: Abzugsverbot für Zinsen und 
Lizenzgebühren, taxlex 2014, 105; Wimpissinger, Ist die Nichtabzugsfähigkeit von Zinsen und Lizenzgebühren 
nach § 12 KStG unionsrechtswidrig?, SWI 2014, 220. 
13 The proposal of a new Sec. 4(5a) ITA had the following wording: Expenses are not deductible if they are tax 
exempt at the level of the recipient due to a different characterisation of the loan in the recipient country.“ 
(Author’s translation); see Kahlenberg, Neue Beschränkungen des Zinsabzugs: Regelungsempfehlungen gegen 
doppelte Nichtbesteuerungs- und Double-Dip-Strukturen, ISR 2014, 91; Linn, Zum Entwurf einer 
Betriebsausgabenabzugsbeschränkung im Zollkodex-Anpassungsgesetz, IStR 2014, 920. 
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The non-deductibility of interest payments does not conflict with tax treaties that contain a provision 
similar to Article  24(4) OECD Model Tax Convention (MC).14 Article  24(4) OECD MC provides: 
“4. Except where the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 9, paragraph 6 of Article 11, or paragraph 4 of Article 
“of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be 
deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State. 
Similarly, any debts of an enterprise of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for 
the purpose of determining the taxable capital of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if 
they had been contracted to a resident of the first-mentioned State.” 
According to this provision, a Contracting State may not discriminate against its own resident 
enterprises just because they make a payment to a non-resident. Payments made to an enterprise of 
the other Contracting State must be deductible under the same conditions as payments made to 
domestic enterprises. Article  24(4) OECD MC prohibits all discriminations which are based on 
residence of the recipient of the payments. A distinction based on criteria other than residence is still 
permitted.15 In the case of the primary response the denial of the deduction is not based on 
residence of the enterprise. The reason for the non-deductibility is that the payments are tax exempt 
at the level of the recipient company. One could argue that residence in the other Contracting State 
and tax exemption of the payments are linked: in general, if the recipient is a company resident in 
the other Contracting State the payments will be regarded as dividends and are, therefore, tax 
exempt. However, residence in the other Contracting State is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition. If the payment is made to another resident enterprise which has a permanent 
establishment in the other Contracting State and the payments are attributable to the permanent 
establishment the payments will not be deductible either as they are tax exempt at the level of the 
permanent establishment. By contrast, if the recipient is a company resident in the other Contracting 
State which has a permanent establishment in the first Contracting State and the payments are 
attributable to the permanent establishment then the payments will be deductible although received 
by a non-resident enterprise. Residence and tax exemption are not identical criteria. Article 24(4) 
OECD MC is not violated.  
2.2.1.2. Compatibility with the interest and royalty directive 
The primary response does not conflict with the Council Directive on a common system of taxation 
applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different 
                                                          
14 See also OECD BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2, para 144 et seq..; concerning the question 
whether disallowing the deductibility of interest payments is in line with Art. 9 OECD MC see Beiser, 
Ausgewogene Aufteilung der Ertragsteuerbefugnis und Abzug von Schuldzinsen und Lizenzgebühren, SWI 2014, 
261; Eigelshoven in: Vogel/Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Commentary, 6. ed. 2015, Art. 9 m.no. 
28b; Ditz in: Schönfeld/Ditz, DBA, Art. 9, m.no. 24.  
15 See Bruns in: Schönfeld/Ditz, DBA, 2013, Art. 24, m.no. 142; Wassermeyer in: Wassermeyer, 
Doppelbesteuerung, Commentary, 129th ed. 2015, Art. 24 m.no. 73; Rust in: Vogel/Lehner, 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Commentary, 6th ed. 2015, Art. 24 m.no. 145. 
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Member States16 (the interest and royalty directive) either. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) held in its judgment in Scheuten Solar that Article  1(1) of the directive only prevents 
the source state from levying a tax at the level of the recipient of the payments. Denying the 
deductibility of the payments at the level of the payer does not violate the directive.17 
2.2.1.3. Compatibility with the fundamental freedoms 
Denying a deduction for interest payments made to a company resident in another Member State 
and allowing a deduction for comparable payments made to a domestic company might conflict with 
the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU.18 Comparable situations are treated in an unequal way.19 
Sometimes these rules are drafted in a neutral way; according to the wording of the provisions, the 
deductibility of a payment does not depend on the residence of the recipient but on whether the 
payments are tax exempt at the level of the recipient. In theory, the provisions could apply in a 
purely domestic and in a cross-border context. Within the same Member State the distinction 
between equity and debt is always the same. Hybrid mismatches only arise in a cross-border 
situation. Despite the apparently neutral formulation a distinction on the basis of an exemption of 
the payment at the level of the recipient constitutes a hidden discrimination as it applies only to 
cross-border situations.20  
A different treatment of domestic and cross-border situations is only permissible if the different 
treatment can be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest.  
                                                          
16 Council Directive of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments 
made between associated companies of different Member States (OJ 2003 L 157, p. 0049.  
17 EuGH 21 July 2011, Scheuten Solar Technology GmbH v Finanzamt Gelsenkirchen-Süd.(C-397/09) (Scheuten 
Solar), ECR 2011, I-6455, ECLI:EU:C:2011:499,  
para 28: “It follows that Article 1(1) of Directive 2003/49, read in the light of recitals 2 to 4 in the preamble to 
the directive, aims to avoid legal double taxation of cross-border payments of interest by prohibiting the 
taxation of interest in the source Member State to the detriment of the actual beneficial owner. That provision 
thus concerns solely the tax position of the interest creditor.“; see Goebel/Küntscher, Gewerbesteuerliche 
Hinzurechnung von Zinsen auf dem europarechtlichen Prüfstand - Ein Beitrag anlässlich der Urteilsverkündung 
im Fall Scheuten Solar Technology, IStR 2011, 630; Englisch, Comment on the request of the Bundesfinanzhof 
for a preliminary ruling (Scheuten Solar), Highlights & Insights 2010, 28; Peyerl, Das neue Abzugsverbot für Zins- 
und Lizenzzahlungen im Konzern, ÖStZ 2014, 223 (224); a.A. dagegen Wimpissinger, Ist die 
Nichtabzugsfähigkeit von Zinsen und Lizenzgebühren nach § 12 KStG unionsrechtswidrig?, SWI 2014, 220. 
18 In favour of the applying of the freedom to provide services to loan agreements see ECJ 9 July 1997, Société 
Civile Immobilière Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie (C-222/95) (Parodi), ERC 1997, I-3899, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:345 para 17; Müller-Graf in: Streinz, EUV/AEUV, 2. Aufl. 2012, Art. 56 AEUV m.no. 22; in favour 
of applying the free movement of capital to loan agreements see Sedlaczek/Züger in: Streinz, EUV/AEUV, 2. 
Aufl. 2012, Art. 63 AEUV m.no. 19. If a loan is granted between two members of the same group the freedom 
of establishment might apply. 
19 The ECJ 12. July 2005, Egon Schempp v Finanzamt München V.(C-403/03) (Schempp), Slg. 2005, I-6421, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:446 para 35, however, argues that alimony payments made to an Austrian resident are not 
comparable to alimony payments to a German resident. 
20 For the prohibition of hidden discriminations see already ECJ 12 February 1974, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v 
Deutsche Bundespost (152/73) (Sotgiu), ECR 1974, 153, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13, para 11. 
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The fight against tax abuse constitutes a legitimate purpose which justifies a restriction of the 
fundamental freedoms.21 Disallowing a deduction of interest payments in all cases of hybrid 
mismatches to fight abuse is, however, not proportionate.22 The CJEU held in its Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment that domestic anti-avoidance rules must be restricted to fight wholly artificial 
arrangements.23 In general, hybrid mismatch arrangements do not lack substance. Denying a 
deduction in all cases of hybrid mismatch arrangements – even if these arrangements are not wholly 
artificial – would, therefore, go beyond what is necessary to fight abuse. In its decision RBS 
Deutschland which concerned a VAT case the ECJ stated that tax arbitrage – using different VAT rules 
in two Member States – does not constitute tax abuse.24 The case dealt with the following situation: 
A company resident in Germany provided leasing services in the UK. In the UK, these leasing 
arrangements were regarded as supply of services. From the perspective of the UK the place of 
supply of the services was the place where the supplier had established his business. As the supplier 
was a resident of Germany the supply of services was not taxable in the UK. From the perspective of 
Germany, however, the leasing arrangement was regarded as a supply of goods. The place of the 
supply of goods was in the UK as the goods were located in the UK. As a consequence, the leasing 
arrangement was not taxable in Germany either. Despite the double non-taxation, the German 
company asked for a refund of the input VAT. The company relied on Article 17(3) of the Sixth 
Council Directive.25According to this provision, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction or a refund of 
his input VAT if the leasing arrangement would be eligible for deduction of tax had the place of 
supply of services been in the UK. This was the case, the German company would have been entitled 
to a deduction or a refund had the services been supplied in the UK. The CJEU stated that  
“[i]n so far as differences in the laws and regulations of the Member States continue to exist in this 
area, despite the establishment of the common system of VAT by the provisions of the directive, the 
fact that a Member State has not collected output VAT because of the manner in which it has 
                                                          
21 See Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, 2002, p. 950 et seq.; L.de Broe, 
International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, (IBFD, 2008), p. 799 et seq. 
22 See Wimpissinger, Ist die Nichtabzugsfähigkeit von Zinsen und Lizenzgebühren nach § 12 KStG 
unionsrechtswidrig?, SWI 2014, 220. 
23 ECJ 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v HMRC ( C-196/04) 
(Cadbury Schweppes), ECR 2006,  I-7995, ECLI:EU:C:2006:544, para 55; see also ECJ 13 March 2007, Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (C-524/04) (Test Claimants in 
the Thin Cap Group Litigation), ECR 2007, I-2107, ECLI:EU:C:2007:161 para 72; ECJ 16 July 1998, Imperial 
Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes). (C-264/96) (ICI), ECR 
1998, I-4695, ECLI:EU:C:1998:370 para 26. 
24 ECJ 22 December 2010, HMRC v RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH (C-277/09) (RBS Deutschland Holding), 
ECR 2010, I-13805, ECLI:EU:C:2010:810. 
25 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 
0001; Art. 17(3)(a). 
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categorised a commercial transaction cannot deny a taxable person the right to deduct input VAT 
paid in another Member State.”26  
The UK Government argued that making use of the differences in tax law of two different countries 
should be characterised as abusive but the Court refuted that argument by stating that 
 “[i]n those circumstances, the fact that services were supplied to a company established in one 
Member State by a company established in another Member State, and that the terms of the 
transactions carried out were chosen on the basis of factors specific to the economic operators 
concerned, cannot be regarded as constituting an abuse of rights. RBS Deutschland in fact provided 
the services at issue in the course of a genuine economic activity.”27 The Court goes on by saying: “It 
is important to add that taxable persons are generally free to choose the organisational structures 
and the form of transactions which they consider to be most appropriate for their economic activities 
and for the purposes of limiting their tax burdens.”28 
Transferring this decision from the field of VAT to direct taxation means that tax arbitrage 
transactions may not be regarded as abusive if the transactions do not lack substance. As a result, 
limiting the deductibility of interest payments made to foreign companies cannot be justified by the 
argument to fight abuse.  
At most, the denial of a deduction for interest payments which are excessive and not in line with the 
arm’s length standard can be justified as an anti-abuse measure.29  
However, it seems to be possible that the non-deductibility of interest payments may be justified to 
achieve the coherence of the tax system if the payments are tax exempt at the level of the recipient. 
The different treatment at the level of the payor can be justified by the fact that the treatment at the 
level of the recipient is different as well: the payments are not deductible at the level of the payor if 
they are exempt at the level of the recipient and they are deductible at the level of the payor if they 
are taxable at the level of the recipient. The jurisprudence of the CJEU is ambiguous as to whether a 
Member State may adopt a linking rule and make the deductibility of payments dependent on the 
tax treatment in another Member State. There are good arguments that a principle of 
correspondence is in line with the fundamental freedoms.  
                                                          
26 RBS Deutschland Holding, above fn.24,  C-277/09, ECR 2010, I-13805, para 42. 
27RBS Deutschland Holding, above fn.24, C-277/09, ECR 2010, I-13805, para 52. 
28RBS Deutschland Holding, above fn.24, C-277/09, ECR 2010, I-13805, para 53. 
29 See ECJ 21 January 2010, Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) v État belge(C-311/08) (SGI), ECR 2010, I-487, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:26, para 72; ECJ 5. July 2012, Société d'investissement pour l'agriculture tropicale SA (SIAT) v 
État belge (C-318/10) (SIAT), ECLI:EU:C:2012:415, para 52. 
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The CJEU confirmed in several judgments that the fundamental freedoms do not oblige a Member 
State to avoid juridical double taxation.30 With regard to double taxation a Member State does not 
have to adapt its own tax system to the tax system of other Member States and take into account 
that the taxes due in other Member States reduce the ability to pay of the taxpayer. However, in 
other judgments the CJEU came to the opposite conclusion and decided that a Member State has to 
take the tax situation in the other Member State into consideration. For instance, the State of the 
parent company has to allow a deduction for losses incurred in a foreign subsidiary if the subsidiary 
can no longer use these losses in its residence state. 31 The same interdependence between the laws 
of two Member States also applies with regard to losses of a foreign permanent establishment. EU 
law requires the State of the head office to allow a deduction for foreign losses incurred by the 
permanent establishment if it is no longer possible to use the losses in the permanent establishment 
state.32 The CJEU also held that the source state has to allow a deduction for certain personal 
expenses and grant the non-resident taxpayer access to the zero bracket if the residence state 
cannot take these deductions into account in case the taxpayer does not earn income in the 
residence state.33 According to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the Member State of the shareholder 
also has to grant an indirect credit for taxes paid in another Member State if it allows an indirect 
credit in a domestic setting.34 In all these cases one Member State had to adapt its own law to the tax 
                                                          
30 ECJ 14 November 2006, Mark Kerckhaert, Bernadette Morres v Belgische Staat (C-513/04) (Kerckhaert and 
Morres), ECR 2006, I-10967, ECLI:EU:C:2006:713; ECJ 16 July 2009, Jacques Damseaux v Belgian State(C-
128/08) (Damseaux), ECR 2009, I-6823, ECLI:EU:C:2009:471; ECJ 12 February 2009, Margarete Block v 
Finanzamt Kaufbeuren (C-67/08) (Block), ECR 2009, I-883, ECLI:EU:C:2009:92; see also the seminal work by G. 
Kofler, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (Linde Verlag, 2007) 
see also A.Rust (Hrsg.), Double Taxation within the European Union, (Wolters Kluwer,2011). 
31 From an EU perspective a cross-border loss compensation is only possible if the Member State of the parent 
allows a consolidation of profits and losses between parent and subsidiary in a domestic setting. Se ECJ 13 
December 2005, Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) (C-446/03) (Marks & 
Spencer), ECR 2005, I-10837, ECLI:EU:C:2005:763; ECJ 18 July 2007, Oy AA, (C-231/05) (Oy AA), ECR 2007, I-
6373, ECLI:EU:C:2007:439; see also, M. Lang, The Marks and Spencer Case — The Open Issues Following the 
ECJ's Final Word, European Taxation, 2006, 54; M.Lang, European Union - Has the Case Law of the ECJ on Final 
Losses Reached the End of the Line?, European Taxation, (Volume 54), No 12, 2014, 530; G. Kofler, Marks & 
Spencer: Bedingte Verpflichtung zur Hereinnahme von Verlusten ausländischer Tochtergesellschaften, ÖStZ 
2006, 48. 
32 ECJ 15 Mai 2008, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt Heilbronn (C-414/06) (Lidl Belgium), ECR 2008, I-
3601, ECLI:EU:C:2008:278; ECJ 23 October 2008, Finanzamt für Körperschaften III in Berlin v Krankenheim 
Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH (C-157/07) (Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-
Seniorenheimstatt), ECR 2008, I-8061, ECLI:EU:C:2008:588; see also W. Haslehner, Cross-Border Loss Relief for 
Permanent Establishments under EC Law, Bulletin for International Taxation, (2010) 64 (1), 33. 
33 ECJ 14 February 1995, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker (C-279/93) (Schumacker), ECR 1995, I-
225, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31; see also Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, 2002, 
p. 480 et seq.;  Schnitger, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu Berücksichtigung persönlicher Verhältnisse, eine 
Sackgasse?, IStR 2002, 478. 
34 ECJ 7 September 2004, Petri Manninen. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Korkein hallinto-oikeus - 
Finland.(C-319/02) (Manninen), ECR 2004, I-7477, ECLI:EU:C:2004:484; see also J. Englisch, Fiscal Cohesion in 
the Taxation of Cross-Border Dividends (Part Two), European Taxation, 2004, 355; A. Rust, Renaissance der 
Kohärenz, EWS 2004, 450-454. 
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law of the other Member State and take the tax treatment in the other Member State into account 
for its own tax assessment.  
In other judgments the CJEU did not go so far as to create an obligation to take the tax treatment in 
the other Member State into account but stated that a Member State is not prevented from taking 
the tax situation in the other Member State into consideration. For instance, a Member State may 
deny a tax benefit to avoid the taxpayer receiving the benefit twice. In the de Groot judgment, the 
CJEU held that the residence state of the taxpayer may restrict the deductibility of personal expenses 
to the extent that these expenses are already taken care of in the source state.35 The CJEU came to a 
similar conclusion in the N judgment and stated that the former residence state is no longer obliged 
to take into account decreases in value of the shares after the emigration of the taxpayer if the new 
residence state allows a deduction for the decreases after immigration.36 In addition, a Member 
State may – under certain conditions – still treat non-residents in a discriminatory way if the 
discrimination is neutralised by the residence state.37 In this line of jurisprudence the non-residence 
state may adapt its tax law to the tax treatment in the other Member State. 
The Eurowings and the Schempp judgments of the CJEU are especially relevant to the question 
whether the deductibility of interest payments at the level of the payor can be made dependent on 
the taxability of the payments at the level of the recipient.38 However, both judgments come to 
                                                          
35 ECJ 12 December 2002, F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (C-385/00) (de Groot), ECR 2002, I-
11819, ECLI:EU:C:2002:750, par 99 et seq.; see also P. Wattel, Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-
EC Allocation of Personal Tax Allowances, European Taxation 2000, 210; Valat, General Allowances and Home 
State Obligations under EC Law: Opinion Delivered in the de Groot Case, European Taxation 2002, 446. 
36 ECJ 7 September 2006, N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo. (C-470/04) (N), ECR 2006, 
I-7409, ECLI:EU:C:2006:525, para 54. However, this jurisprudence seems to have changed in the meantime: 
According to ECJ 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam (C-371/10) (National Grid Indus), ECR 2011, I-12273, ECLI:EU:C:2011:785, para 58 
et seq., the former residence state is never obliged to take post emigration decreases in value of the shares 
into account. 
37 For the requirement that the credit obligation must be contained in a tax treaty and that the residence state 
is indeed capable of granting a credit for the discriminatory source tax see ECJ 14 December 2006, Denkavit 
Internationaal BV and Denkavit France SARL v Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (C-170/05) 
(Denkavit), ECR 2006, I-11949, ECLI:EU:C:2006:783; ECJ 8 November 2007, Amurta SGPS v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Amsterdam (C-379/05) (Amurta), ECR 2007, I-9569, ECLI:EU:C:2007:655; ECJ 11 September 
2008, D. M. M. A. Arens-Sikken v Staatssecretaris van Financiën(C-43/07) (Arens-Sikken), ECR 2008, I-6887, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:490; ECJ 19 November 2009, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. (C-
540/07) (Commission v. Italy), ECR 2009, I-10983, ECLI:EU:C:2009:717; for a differing view see EFTA Court 23 
November 2004, Fokus Bank ASA v. The Norwegian State (E-1/04) (Fokus Bank ASA), EFTA Ct. Rep. 2004, 11; 
see also the seminal article by G. Kofler, Tax Treaty “Neutralization“ of Source State Discrimination under the 
EU Fundamental Freedoms?, BIT 2011, 684. 
38 ECJ 26 October 1999, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna (C-294/97) (Eurowings), ECR 
1999, I-7447, ECLI:EU:C:1999:524.; see for this judgment A. Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und 
nationales Steuerrecht, 2002, p. 692 et seq.; ECJ 12 July 2005, C-403/03 (Schempp),above fn.19,  ECR 2005, I-
6421, ECLI:EU:C:2005:446; see for this judgment M. Lang, ECJ Decision in the Schempp Case: More Room for 
Member States, SWI 2005, 411. 
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different conclusions. In its Eurowings decision the Court held that the deductibility of leasing 
payments for purposes of the German trade tax may not be denied just because the payments are 
not subject to trade tax at the level of the recipient. As the advantage (deductibility of the payments 
at the level of the payor) and the disadvantage (taxation of the payments at the level of the 
recipient) concerned two different taxpayers the Court decided that there is only an indirect link 
between advantage and disadvantage so that the different treatment cannot be justified by reason 
of the coherence of the tax system.39 The Court also stated that the low taxation or non-taxation at 
the level of the recipient cannot justify the non-deductibility of the payments at the level of the 
payor. According to the Court  
“any tax advantage resulting for providers of services from the low taxation to which they are subject 
in the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another Member State to 
justify less favourable treatment in tax matters given to recipients of services established in the latter 
State…[S]uch compensatory tax arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single market.”40  
If one follows this line of reasoning the primary response suggested by the OECD would not be in line 
with the fundamental freedoms. The deductibility of the interest payments may not be refused with 
the argument that the payments benefit from a tax exemption at the level of the recipient. In the 
author’s opinion, however, the fight against hybrid mismatch arrangements goes well beyond 
compensatory measures in case of low- or no taxation. Low taxation or a tax exemption are generally 
the result of the deliberate decision of a country to grant a tax advantage. With regard to hybrid 
mismatch arrangements the taxpayer makes use of the differences in tax law between two countries. 
Both countries agree that the payments should be taxed either at the level of the payor or at the 
level of the recipient. Both countries only disagree on which level the tax should be levied. Denying 
the deductibility at the level of the payor achieves a one-time taxation which is the result desired by 
both countries. One could interpret the Schempp41 judgment in this way. Pursuant to this decision, it 
is not contrary to the fundamental freedoms to make the deductibility of alimony payments 
dependent on these payments being taxed at the level of the dependant. If one Member State 
generally exempts alimony payments from tax the other Member State may deny the deductibility of 
the payments at the level of the payor. The Court already excluded the comparability of payments to 
domestic dependants which were taxable with payments to foreign dependents which were not 
taxable by stating:  
                                                          
39 ECJ 26 October 1999, C-294/97 (Eurowings), above fn.38, ECR 1999, I-7447, ECLI:EU:C:1999:524 para 41 et 
seq. 
40 ECJ 26 Oktober 1999, C-294/97 (Eurowings), above fn.38, ECR 1999, I-7447, ECLI:EU:C:1999:524, para 44 et 
seq.; this judgment is confirmed by ECJ 5 July 2012, C-318/10 (SIAT), ECLI:EU:C:2012:415, para 39. 
41 Schempp (C-403/03),above fn.19,  ECR 2005, I-6421, ECLI:EU:C:2005:446 
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“It follows that, contrary to Mr Schempp’s claims, the payment of maintenance to a recipient 
resident in Germany cannot be compared to the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in 
Austria. The recipient is subject in each of those two cases, as regards taxation of the maintenance 
payments, to a different tax system. Consequently, the fact that a taxpayer resident in Germany is 
not able, under Paragraph 1a(1)(1) of the EStG, to deduct maintenance paid to his former spouse 
resident in Austria does not constitute discrimination within the meaning of Article 1242 EC.”43  
The Schempp case also concerned differences which were attributable to two legal systems. While 
Germany allowed alimony payments – under certain conditions – to be deductible if they were 
taxable at the level of the dependant Austria disallowed a deduction at the level of the payor and 
exempted the payments at the level of the dependant. The Court regarded the denial of the 
deduction in Germany as appropriate to avoid a double non-taxation. 
Overall, there are good reasons to argue that the primary response as proposed by the OECD does 
not conflict with the fundamental freedoms. The differences in treatment – allowing a deduction of 
interest payments if the payments are taxable at the level of the recipient and disallowing a 
deduction of interest payments if the payments are tax exempt a the level of the recipient seem to 
be justified by the need to fight against hybrid mismatch arrangements.  
2.2.2. Defensive Rule 
If the country in which the payor is a resident does not implement the proposal of the OECD and still 
allows a deduction for the interest payments then the obligation to avoid the mismatch switches to 
the residence state of the recipient of the payment. This state should no longer grant an exemption 
but include the payments in the tax base of the recipient. Germany has introduced such a linking rule 
in Sec. 8b(1) CITA.44 In Austria a comparable linking rule can be found in Sec. 10(1) and (7) CITA.45 
2.2.2.1. Compatibility of the defensive rule with tax treaties 
In general, taxing the payments at the level of the recipient in his residence state does not cause any 
conflict with tax treaties. For dividend and interest payments the credit method applies.46 As a result, 
the treaty does not oblige the residence state to exempt the payments. However, some particular 
treaties contain an inter-company dividend exemption preventing the residence state from taxing 
                                                          
42 Now TFEU Art. 18. 
43 ECJ 12 July 2005, Schempp (C-403/03),above fn.19,  ECR 2005, I-6421, ECLI:EU:C:2005:446, para 35 et seq. 
44 If exemption is denied foreign source taxes can be credited in accordance with Sec. 26(1) second sentence 
CITA. If the source taxes are high the credit may be even more beneficial as expenses linked to the foreign 
income are deductible. Sec. 8b(5) CITA does no longer apply. 
45 Sec. 10(1) and (7) Austrian CITA states that dividends are generally tax exempt. This tax exemption does not 
apply if the dividend payments are deductible at the level of the foreign corporation. For a good illustration of 
these rules see Kofler, „Hybride Finanzinstrumente“ in der Mutter-Tochter-RL, ZFR 2014, 214 (216 et seq.). 
46 See Art. 23A(2) und 23B(1) OECD MC. 
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dividend distributions.47 For the question whether the defensive rule proposed by the OECD would 
conflict with inter-company dividend exemptions contained in tax treaties one has to distinguish two 
scenarios: If the characterisation as dividend for treaty purposes is derived from domestic law in 
accordance with Article 10(3) third option OECD MC a hybrid mismatch arrangement cannot arise. 
The residence state of the company making the payment characterises the payment as interest and 
this characterisation is binding for the residence state as well. If the characterisation as dividend is 
derived from the autonomous definition then the inter-company dividend exemption contained in 
the treaty prevents the residence state from taxing the payments although the payments are 
deductible at the level of the payor.  
In its Model Treaty Germany has restricted the scope of the inter-company dividend exemption. An 
exemption for dividends is excluded if the payments are deductible at the level of the paying 
company.48 As a result, the defensive rule will no longer conflict with future treaties concluded by 
Germany. Germany also introduced a treaty overriding provision in its domestic law. It will not apply 
the inter-company dividend exemption contained in its treaties if the payments are deductible at the 
level of the payor.49 As a consequence, Germany will apply the defensive rule irrespective of its 
treaty obligations.50  
2.2.2.2. Compatibility with the parent-subsidiary directive 
Article 4(1)(a) of the parent subsidiary directive in its version of November 30, 201151 requires the 
Member State of the parent company to exempt the payments irrespective of whether or not the 
payments were deductible at the level of the subsidiary. The amendment of the parent-subsidiary 
                                                          
47 See Ismer in: Vogel/Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Kommentar, 6th ed. 2015, Art. 23 m.no. 78 et 
seq., 90 et seq..; Wassermeyer in: Wassermeyer, DBA, 129th ed. 2015, Art. 23 OECD MA m.no. 55. 
48 See Art. 10(1) N°1 sentence 3 of the German Model Treaty 2013 (Basis for negotiation for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital). 
49 Sec. 8b (1) sentence 1-3 CITA has the following wording: “Bezüge im Sinne des § 20 Abs. 1 Nr. 1, 2, 9 und 10 
Buchstabe a des Einkommensteuergesetzes bleiben bei der Ermittlung des Einkommens außer Ansatz. Satz 1 
gilt nur, soweit die Bezüge das Einkommen der leistenden Körperschaft nicht gemindert haben. Sind die Bezüge 
im Sinne des Satzes 1 nach einem Abkommen zur Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung von der 
Bemessungsgrundlage für die Körperschaftsteuer auszunehmen, gilt Satz 2 ungeachtet des Wortlauts des 
Abkommens für diese Freistellung entsprechend.“ 
50 For the relationship between Sec. 8b (1) CITA and tax treaties see Rengers in: Blümich, Kommentar zum EStG, 
KStG und GewStG, 125. Aufl. 2015, § 8b KStG Rz. 140; see also Becker/Loose, Zur geplanten Ausdehnung des 
materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips auf hybride Finanzierungen, IStR 2012, 758 (762); for the question whether 
a treaty override is permissible in German law see Lehner in: Vogel/Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, 
Kommentar, 6th ed. 2015, Grundlagen m.no. 201; idem, Treaty Override im Anwendungsbereich des § 50d 
EStG, IStR 2012, 389; idem, Keine Verfügung des Parlaments über seine Normsetzungsautorität, IStR 2014, 189; 
Vogel, Keine Bindung an völkervertragswidrige Gesetze im offenen Verfassungsstaat. Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht in der Entwicklung, in: Blankenagel/Pernice/Schulze-Fielitz, FS Häberle, 2004, p. 481 et 
seq.; idem, Wortbruch im Verfassungsrecht, JZ 1997, 161 (162); Rust/Reimer, Treaty Override im deutschen 
Internationalen Steuerrecht, IStR 2005, 843. 
51 Council Directive 2011/96/EU  of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. 
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directive of July 8, 201452 now also introduces a linking rule in Article 4(1)(a). According to the new 
version of Article 4(1)(a), the Member State of the parent (or of the permanent establishment) shall 
refrain from taxing the payments “to the extent that such [payments] are not deductible by the 
subsidiary, and tax such [payments] to the extent that such profits are deductible by the subsidiary”. 
Member States opting for the exemption method are, therefore, obliged to implement the defensive 
rule within the EU. For the time before the amendment of the directive entered into force, the 
defensive rule was not in line with the parent-subsidiary directive. Exemption had to be granted 
unconditionally. The Member State of the parent company was not allowed to make the exemption 
dependent on the payments not being deductible at the level of the subsidiary.53 The amendment 
only has an ex-nunc effect and cannot heal the violations of the parent-subsidiary in the past.54  
The territorial scope of the directive is limited to the EU. The directive is silent on how to treat 
payments received from companies located outside the EU.55  
2.2.2.3. Compatibility with the fundamental freedoms 
Depending on the amount of shareholding the distribution of dividends can be covered by the free 
movement of capital or by the freedom of establishment.56 Although the linking rule is drafted in a 
neutral way – as it applies to both domestic and cross-border payments – in reality hybrid mismatch 
arrangements only arise in cross-border situations. The defensive rule can be regarded as a hidden 
discrimination.57 
                                                          
52 Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014 amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. 
53 See ECJ 12 February 2009, Belgische Staat v Cobelfret NV(.C-138/07) (Cobelfret), ECR 2009, I-731, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:82 para 33; ECJ 4 June 2009, Belgische Staat v KBC Bank NV ( C-439/07) (KBC Bank), ECR 2009, I-
4409, ECLI:EU:C:2009:339, para 36 et seq. 
54 Desens, Ist die neue Korrespondenzregel in der Mutter-Tochter-Richtlinie mit dem primären Unionsrecht 
vereinbar?, IStR 2014, 825 (826); idem, Kritische Bestandsaufnahme zu den geplanten Änderungen in § 8b 
KStG, DStR Beih. zu Heft 4/2013, 13 (19). 
55 Germany and Austria apply the linking rule also to payments received from companies outside the European 
Union.  
56 In favour of the application of the free movement of capital see ECJ 6 June 2000, Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen (C-35/98) (Verkooijen), ECR 2000, I-4071, ECLI:EU:C:2000:294, paa 28 et seq.; ECJ 
15 July 2004, Anneliese Lenz v Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol (C-315/02) (Lenz), ECR 2004, I-7063, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:446; in favour of the application of the freedom of establishment se ECJ 23 February 2006, 
Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v Keller Holding GmbH (C-471/04) (Keller Holding), ECR 2006, I-2107, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:143; ECJ 26. June 2008, Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH (C-284/06) (Burda), 
ECR 2008, I-2009,  424, ECLI:EU:C:2008:365; see also Englisch, Dividendenbesteuerung, 2005, S. 215 ff.; Rust, 
Anforderungen an eine EG-rechtskonforme Dividendenbesteuerung, DStR 2009, 2568 (2569 et seq.). The 
German Bundesfinanzhof 29 August 2012, IStR 2012, 935 (937) held that only the freedom of establishment 
applies if the shareholer has an interest of at least 10% in the company. 
57 See already fn. 20; see also Thömmes/Linn, The New German DCL and Dividend Matching Rules and EU Law, 
Intertax 2014, 28 (33). 
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The different treatment of domestic and cross-border dividends is, however, justified.58 In a domestic 
situation the subsidiary distributing the dividends has already been taxed. In a cross-border situation 
the payments were deductible at the level of the subsidiary so that the dividends do not carry an 
underlying corporate tax. The tax exemption of dividends has the goal of avoiding economic double 
taxation. If the payments are deductible an economic double taxation does not occur. A tax 
exemption is not necessary to avoid economic double taxation if the payments are deductible at the 
level of the subsidiary.  
The CJEU has confirmed on several occasions the equal value of the exemption method and the 
indirect credit method.  It held that 
 “European Union law does not prohibit a Member State from preventing the imposition of a series 
of charges to tax on dividends received by a resident company by applying rules which exempt those 
dividends from tax when they are paid by a resident company, while preventing those dividends from 
being liable to a series of charges to tax through an imputation method when they are paid by a non-
resident company…”59  
According to the CJEU,  
“the imputation method enables dividends from non-resident companies to be accorded treatment 
equivalent to that accorded, by the exemption method, to dividends paid by resident companies. 
Application of the imputation method to dividends from non-resident companies makes it possible to 
ensure that foreign-sourced and nationally-sourced portfolio dividends bear the same tax 
burden…”60  
Denying the exemption in case of deductibility also ensures that domestic investments and cross-
border investments bear the same overall tax burden. Denying the exemption and taxing the 
                                                          
58 One could, however, argue that neither the domestic linking rules based on the OECD proposal nor the new 
version of the parent-subsidiary directive achieve the goal of double non-taxation as they incomplete. They 
only cover situations of double non-taxation caused by the deductibility of the payments at the level of the 
payor. If the subsidiary state reduces its corporate tax rate in case of a distribution to zero per cent and the 
parent state exempts the dividends double non-taxation can also arise. This situation is not covered by the 
OECD proposal and the new version of the parent-subsidiary directive. O. Thömmes/Linn, 'The New German 
DCL and Dividend Matching Rules and EU Law' (2014) 42 Intertax, Issue 1, pp. 28 argue that the defensive rule 
does not comply with the freedom of establishment.  
59 ECJ 10 February 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel BetriebsgmbH (C-436/08) and Österreichische Salinen AG 
(C-437/08) v Finanzamt Linz. (Haribo/Salinen), ECR 2011, I-305, ECLI:EU:C:2011:61 para 86; see also ECJ 12 
December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v HMRC (C-446/04) (Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation), ECR 2006, I-11753, ECLI:EU:C:2006:774, paras 48 and 57; ECJ 23 April 2008, The Test Claimants in 
the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation v HMRC (C-201/05) (Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group 
Litigation), ERC 2008, I-2875, ECLI:EU:C:2008:239, para 39; Kofler/Prechtl-Aigner, Die 
Beteiligungsertragsbefreiung nach Haribo und Salinen, GES 2011, 175. 
60 ECJ 10 February 2011, Haribo/Salinen C-436/08 and C-437/08 , above fn.59, ECR 2011, I-305, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:61 para 89. 
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dividends leads to the same result as applying the indirect credit method. In case of the application 
of the indirect credit method the foreign dividends are taxed in the state of the parent company but 
the taxes paid by the subsidiary can be deducted from the tax liability in the state of the parent 
company. If the payments are deductible at the level of the subsidiary there are no taxes of the 
subsidiary to be credited so that the application of the indirect credit method leads to a full taxation 
of the dividends.  
3. Double Deductions 
3.1. Tax planning opportunities 
The BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Report61 also targets tax planning arrangements where interest 
payments are deductible in two countries. Such double deduction can be achieved through the 
creation of a dual resident company. Many countries define the criterion for residence in a different 
way. For example, in Germany a company having its place of management or its registered seat 
within Germany is subject to unlimited tax liability.62 In the US a company is subject to unlimited tax 
liability if it is created in accordance with the laws of the US or of one of its states.63 If a company is 
organised under the laws of the US and managed in Germany it is subject to unlimited tax liability in 
both states. If this dual resident company takes a loan and pays interest on the loan the interest 
payments are deductible in the US and in Germany. Losses of the dual resident company can be 
transferred to companies in the US and in Germany through the use of group regimes.64 
The BEPS Report proposes to limit the deductibility of interest payment in this constellation.65 
Interest payments should only be deductible up to the amount of positive income received by the 
company. Interest which exceeds the amount of positive income can be carried forward. A country 
should only allow a deduction for interest payments if the taxpayer proves that he cannot deduct the 
payments in the other state.  
A double deduction can also be obtained if the taxpayer invests through a permanent establishment 
in another state. If a company sets up a permanent establishment in another country and this 
permanent establishment suffers a loss the company can deduct the permanent establishment losses 
                                                          
61 OECD BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2. 
62 See Sec. 10 and 11 General Tax Code.  
63 See Sec. 7701(a)(4) Internal Revenue Code: The term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or 
partnership means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any 
State… 
64 See for Germany Sec. 14 CITA (Organschaft); for the US see Sec. 1501 IRC. Both countries, however, restrict 
the double use of losses in their domestic tax law. See the dual consolidated loss rules in Sec. 14 (1) first 
sentence N° 5 CITA (Germany) und Sec. 1503(d) IRC (US). 
65 OECD, BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Report, above fn.2. para 103 et seq. 
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from its profits earned by the head office due to the system of world-wide taxation.66 By transferring 
the loss of the permanent establishment to another group member in the same country the loss can 
be deducted for a second time in the permanent establishment state.67 
To solve the double use of losses the BEPS Report proposes a solution consisting of two steps.68 
According to the primary response, the interest payments should be deductible in the permanent 
establishment state only.  The residence state of the company should deny the deduction for interest 
payments borne by the permanent establishment unless it has already taxed positive income of the 
permanent establishment. If the head office state nevertheless allows a deduction for the interest 
payments attributable to the permanent establishment then the defensive rule applies: to the extent 
that the interest payments are deductible in the residence state the permanent establishment state 
has to deny a deduction. Non-deductible expenses can be carried forward.  
In Germany, a legislative draft was discussed in parliament in which interest expenses would no 
longer be deductible if another country allows a deduction for the interest payments.69 However, this 
proposal was abandoned in parliament and never entered into force. Concerning the double use of 
losses in group regimes, Germany has already introduced Sec. 14 (1) first sentence N°5 CITA which 
prevents “double dips”.70 
3.2. Compatibility of the OECD Proposals with the fundamental freedoms 
Denying the deduction of interest expenses in case such expenses are deductible in another country 
as well constitutes a restriction of the freedom of establishment. In a purely domestic situation such 
                                                          
66 The deduction of foreign permanent establishment losses may be excluded by a tax treaty or by a domestic 
foreign loss limitation rule. According to the German Bundesfinanzhof foreign permanent establishment losses 
are no longer deductible if the tax treaties contains the exemption method in accordance with Art. 23A(1) 
OECD MC. Pursuant to the Bundesfinanzhof both positive and negative income can no longer be taken into 
account for calculating the tax base. See Bundesfinanzhof 6 October 1993, I R 32/93, BStBl. II 1994, 113; 
Bundesfinanzhof 17 July 2008, I R 84/04, BStBl. II 2009, 630; see also Ismer in: Vogel/Lehner, 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Kommentar, 6. Aufl. 2015, Art. 23 m.no. 52 ff. A domestic loss limitation rule 
can be found in Germany in Sec 2a (1) first sentence N° 2 ITA. 
67 In Germany permanent establishments can form part of a group consolidation regime, see Sec. 14 (1) first 
sentence N° 2 CITA.  
68 OECD, BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable Report, above fn.2. para 97 et seq. 
69 See the legislative proposal for the introduction of Sec. 4(5a) sentence 2 and 3 ITA of 24 October 2014, BR-
Drs. 432/1/14 p. 12. The proposal had the following wording: “Die einer Betriebsausgabe zugrunde liegenden 
Aufwendungen sind nur abziehbar, soweit die nämlichen Aufwendungen nicht in einem anderen Staat die 
Steuerbemessungsgrundlage mindern. Satz 2 gilt nicht, wenn die Berücksichtigung der Aufwendungen 
ausschließliche dazu dient, einen Progressionsvorhalt i.S.d. § 32b Abs. 1 S. 1 Nr. 3 oder eine Steueranrechnung 
i.S.d. § 34c oder i.S.d. § 26 Abs. 1 des Körperschaftsteuergesetzes zu berücksichtigen.“ See Kahlenberg, Neue 
Beschränkungen des Zinsabzugs: Regelungsempfehlungen gegen doppelte Nichtbesteuerungs- und Double-Dip-
Strukturen, ISR 2014, 91; Linn, Zum Entwurf einer Betriebsausgabenabzugsbeschränkung im Zollkodex-
Anpassungsgesetz, IStR 2014, 920. 
70 See Scheipers/Linn, Zur Unionswidrigkeit des § 14 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 KStG n. F., IStR 2013, 139; Benecke/Schnitger, 
Wichtige Änderungen bei der körperschaftsteuerlichen Organschaft durch das UntStG 2013, IStR 2013, 143. 
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expenses would have been clearly deductible. The avoidance of the double use of losses can, 
however, be regarded as an imperative requirement in the general interest capable of restricting the 
fundamental freedoms. The CJEU introduced this ground of justification in its Marks & Spencer 
judgment and has since used it in several other judgments.71 During recent years this jurisprudence 
has been refined in the following way: a Member State may deny the deductibility of losses incurred 
in a foreign permanent establishment if the permanent establishment state takes these losses into 
account as well.72 By contrast, if the losses are incurred within its territory a Member State may not 
deny the deduction of these losses even if another state allows a deduction as well. The CJEU stated 
in the Philips Electronics judgment that 
 “the host Member State, on whose territory the economic activity giving rise to the losses of the 
permanent establishment is carried out, cannot, in a situation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, use the objective of preserving the allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
the Member States as justification for the fact that, under its national legislation, the possibility of 
transferring, by means of group relief and to a resident company, losses sustained by the permanent 
establishment in that Member State of a non-resident company is subject to a condition that those 
losses cannot be used for the purposes of foreign taxation…”73  
The CJEU held that under the arguments the prevention of the double use of losses cannot be 
invoked as justification either: 
 “As regards, secondly, the objective of preventing the double use of losses, it must be observed that 
even if such a ground, considered independently, could be relied on, it cannot in any event be relied 
                                                          
71 ECJ. 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer,C-446/03 above fn.31,  ECR 2005, I-10837, ECLI:EU:C:2005:763, 
para 47: “As regards the second justification, relating to the danger that losses would be used twice, it must be 
accepted that Member States must be able to prevent that from occurring.“ see also ECJ 29 March 2007, Rewe 
Zentralfinanz eG v Finanzamt Köln-Mitte (C-347/04) (Rewe Zentralfinanz), ECR 2007, I-2647, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:194, para 47; ECJ 15 May 2008, Lidl Belgium (C-414/06), above fn.32, ECR 2008, I-3601, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:278 para 35. Kahlenberg, Neue Beschränkungen des Zinsabzugs: Regelungsempfehlungen 
gegen doppelte Nichtbesteuerungs- und Double-Dip-Strukturen, ISR 2015, 91 (96) argues that the double use of 
losses constitutes the other side of the coin which is double taxation. If two countries tax the positive income 
of the same taxpayer both countries have to allow a deduction for negative income as well.  
72 See ECJ 6 September 2012, HMRC v Philips Electronics UK Ltd (C-18/11) (Philips Electronics), 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:532, para 26; see also the opinion of Advocate General Kokott  of 19 April 2012, C-18/11 
(Philips Electronics), ECLI:EU:C:2012:532, para 51; see also B.Terra, P.Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th ed.(Wolters 
Kluwer, 2012), p. 938. 
73 See ECJ 6 September 2012, Philips Electronics (C-18/11), above fn.72,  ECLI:EU:C:2012:532, para 27. The CJEU 
focused on the different treatment of domestic companies and permanent establishments. While domestic 
company could deduct losses even if these losses were deductible in other Member State as well permanent 
establishments of foreign companies were not allowed to deduct losses if these losses were deductible in other 
countries. See also Schiefer, Anmerkung, IStR 2012, 849. 
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on in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings to justify the national legislation of the 
host Member State.”74 
Advocate General Kokott had already argued in her opinion in re Philips Electronics that the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers of the permanent establishment state is not restricted in any way by the 
fact that another country takes into account the losses as well.75 The permanent establishment state 
is not permitted to deny a deduction of losses which have been incurred within its territory just 
because another Member States allows a deduction of these losses as well.  
As a consequence, the defensive rule obliging the permanent establishment state to disallow losses 
incurred within its territory to avoid the double use of losses does not comply with the freedom of 
establishment. 
4. Conclusions 
The OECD Report “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements Action 2: 2014 
Deliverable” of 16 September 201476 makes several proposals to avoid double non-taxation caused 
by tax arbitrage. The proposals – if implemented – will achieve their goal. They are capable of limiting 
the use of hybrid instruments and of structures to generate double deductions. In the author’s 
opinion, the proposals are not very balanced. They only target the problem of double non-taxation 
and do not deal with the problem of remaining double taxation.77 The proposals require an effective 
exchange of information. Linking its own tax law to the laws of another state is only possible if the 
provisions in the other state are known and understood. The BEPS proposals can be regarded as 
generally compliant with the non-discrimination provisions contained in tax treaties and in the TFEU. 
However, the OECD proposal to fight against double deduction schemes with regard to foreign 
permanent establishments – the defensive rule – is not in line with the fundamental freedoms. The 
permanent establishment state may not justify the denial of a deduction for interest expenses with 
the argument that the expenses are already deductible in the head office state. As the expenses are 
borne by the permanent establishment, the permanent establishment state is prohibited from 
denying the deductibility of the expense in a discriminatory way.  
                                                          
74 ECJ 6 September 2012, Philips Electronics (C-18/11), above fn.72,   ECLI:EU:C:2012:532, para 28. 
75 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott of 19 April 2012, Philips Electronics (C-18/11), above fn.72, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:532, para 50; see also Thömmes and Linn, above fn. 58, (2014) 42 Intertax, Issue 1, pp. 28 (30). 
76 BEPS Action 2 Deliverable Report, above fn.2. 
77 Van den Hurk, Proposed Amended Parent-Subsidiary Directive Reveals the European Commission’s Lack of 
Vision, BIT 2014, 488 (490) describes the EU measures as one-sided. See also L.Richter and D.Reeb, Zur 
Ausdehnung des materiellen Korrespondenzprinzips in § 8b Abs 1 S. 2 KStG durch das AmtshilfeRLUmsG im 
Spannungsfeld von Europa- und Völkerrecht, IStR 2015, 40 (52). 
 
